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A PRIVATE CLUB
to the process of change when it comes to the modification and improve-
ment of its own culture. But the importation of a foreign system at the
expense of that which is African is always dispised and rejected. Thus,
after nearly 200 years of alien domination, tribal Africa remains virtu-
ally the same, waiting to change its own way.
There is a need for a new system of land tenure, but the urgency
with which a new land system can be made available depends upon the
diligence and sincerity with which African governments approach the
problem.
CHEA CIEAPOO
"Is It in Fact a Private Club?"
The main question, whether a club is or is not "in fact" a private
club, is one from which has arisen great controversy and sharp dissent
among the American judiciary today. It has in itself initiated a judiciary
revolution because in the long fight for civil rights, judges have explored
the Constitution and its varying intended interpretations. Since the ques-
tion has aroused the judiciary in such a challenging manner, the courts
have had to unify their efforts and apply several standards as set by the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and try to come as close as possible to the in-
terpretive intention of Congress in passing the Act.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title II, Sections 201 A, B-i, 2, 3, 4b;
201 D, E, 203, 204 is directly applicable to public accommodations as it
relates to the effect these accommodations have on interstate commerce,
and state action as related to discriminatory support. These sections also
define public accommodations and their applicability to the enforcement
of the Title under the Act.
Section 201 (A) provides that "all persons shall be entitled to the
tull and equal enjoyment of goods, service, facilities, privileges, advan-
tages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation as de-
fined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on grounds
of race, color, religion or national origin."
Section 201 (B) provides for establishments affecting interstate com-
merce or supported in their activities by state action. Such places of public
accommodations are lodgings, facilities principally engaged in selling
food for consumption on the premises, gas stations, places of exhibition
or entertainment and other covered establishments. Each of. the follow-
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ing establishments which serves the public is a place of public accommo-
dations within the meaning of this subchapter if its operations affect com-
merce or if discrimination or segregation by it is supported by state action:
1. Hotels, motels, inns or other similar establishments serving transient
guests, except those located in a building which has not more than five
rooms for rent and is actually occupied by the proprietor as his residence.
2. Restaurant, cafeteria, lunch room (counter), soda fountain or other fa-
cility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises
included, but not limited to, any such facility located .on the premises of
any retail establishment, or any gas station. 3. Any motion picture
house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or other place of ex-
hibition or entertainment. 4. Any establishment, (a) (i) which is phys-
ically located within the premises of any establishment otherwise cov-
ered by this sub-section or (ii) within the premises of which is physically
located any such covered establishment and (b) which holds itself out
as serving patrons of such covered establishment.
Section 201 (C) covers the operations of an establishment affecting
commerce within the meaning if (1) it is one of the establishments de-
scribed in paragraph 1 of sub-section B of this section; (2) in the case
of an establishment described in paragraph (2) of sub-section (B) of
this section, it serves or offers to serve interstate travelers a substantial
portion of the food it serves or gasoline or other products which have
moved in commerce; (3) in case of establishments in paragraph (3) of
sub-section (B) of this section, it customarily presents films, perfor-
mances, athletic teams, exhibitions or other sources of entertainment
which move in commerce and (4) establishments described in para-
graph (4) of sub-section (B) of this section.
Section 201 (D) provides that discrimination or segregation by an es-
tablishment is supported by state action within the meaning of this section
if such discrimination or segregation: (1) is carried on under color of any
law, statute, ordinance, or regulation or (2) is carried on under color of
any custom, usage required or enforced by officials of the state or political
sub-division thereof or (3) is required by action of the state or political
subdivision thereof.
Section 201 (E), The provisions of this title shall not apply to a
private club or other establishment not in fact open to the public, except
to the extent that the facilities of such establishment are made available
to the customers or patrons of an establishment within the scope of sub-
section (B).
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A PRIVATE CLUB
Section 203 provides that no person shall deprive, withhold, deny or
attempt to withhold, deny, or deprive or attempt to deprive any person
of any right, or privilege secured by Section 201 or 202 or interfere or
attempt to interfere with the exercise of any such right or privilege, punish
or attempt to punish, intimidate or coerce for exercising or attempting to
exercise any right or privilege secured by Section 201 or 202 of this title.
Section 204 (A) authorizes any person aggrieved to consult the At-
torney General to institute an action for injunctive relief for violations
of Section 203.
Section 204 (B) permits the courts in any action commenced, pur-
suant to this title, to allow the prevailing party other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs and provides that
the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.1
The courts in interpreting these sections define and determine whether
or not a bona fide private club exists. There has been an increasing
number of cases which have explored the various standards set by the Act
and their intended meanings. The effectiveness of the sections of the 1964
Civil Rights Act which the courts have interpreted is expressed through
the courts' exploration of the intent behind these offending organizations
as well as the entire operation of the organizations and to exempt from
coverage only those clubs which are in fact genuinely private. The bulk
of the litigation in the area of public accommodation for the past three
years has centered upon the Act's coverage.' Since the statutory inclu-
sions and exclusions of Title II appear to be patterned after the historical
test of dependence-that an interstate traveler is more dependent on the
hotel, motel, and various facilities contained or located within them, than
he is on a barbershop, beauty parlor, or bowling alley, the coverage of
the Act will continue to be extended by case-by-case litigation.8
Generally, in determining the validity and genuineness of these so-
called private club operations, the courts examine six basic elements:
(1) the membership process, (2) the affect the operations have on com-
merce, (3) the use of the facilities by non-members, (4) the control ' and
participation of members, (5) the support of the state in the discrimina-
tory policies and (6) the use of the finances received by the club.4
The element of membership is one of the most important points
1 Pub. L. No. 88-352; 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
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considered in the final determination. Congress recognized that a bona
fide private club should be able to restrict its services to its members; how-
ever the Act is silent on whether clubs can discriminate in the selection
of those members.5 The purpose of Congress in limiting those clubs that
were to be exempted from the arms of the Act was to separate those estab-
lishments which were not in fact private but were sham operations using
the private club veil as a cover to carry on their discriminatory policies.
A characteristic of most of the so-called private clubs is the inconsistent
treatment of Negro applicants and white applicants. The Negro applica-
tions that are taken are seldom, if ever, acted upon and therefore the
applicant is never notified of the outcome, while on the other hand, the
white applicants are notified of their acceptance shortly after applying.
Those black applications that are taken are very quickly rejected
without any committee or representative ever meeting or interview-
ing the applicant so as to have concrete grounds for acceptance or
rejection. In Nesmith v. YMCA of Raleigh,' a Negro minister ap-
plied for membership in the Men's Athletic Club, but was rejected as
insincere, without any interview or meeting with the club's official. In this
case the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision and one
ground for declaring the Athletic Club not private was that the plaintiff's
application was rejected without any club meeting with the prospective
applicant to form a basis for the determination of his acceptance or re-
jection. Another indication that these operations are sham establish-
ments is the fact that usually all white applicants are accepted for mem-
bership and no Negro applicants are ever accepted.7
There are also many ostensible requirements to be met when Negroes
seek admission or membership, but these requirements never apply to
whites who seek the same admission or membership. Membership cards
are a common example of this. In many instances there have been
members of the white public who have used the facilities of the so-called
private club, who were not members, nor guests of members and who were
transient guests. These ostensible membership requirements are usually
a mere subterfuge to avoid coverage of the Civil Rights Act.' The
requirement of having two sponsors and two references are actually
cover-up devices because most Negroes do not know the club members
"Le Marquis Dejarmon (Spring 1968), Public Accommodations, ILLINOIS
LAw FORUM, 194.
6 397 F.2d 96 (1968).
Lackey v. Sacoolas, 9 RAcE RELATIONS LAw REPORTER, 2625 (1964).
" Daniel v. Paul, 393 U.S. 975 (1969).
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and will not be able to get any references from the members, or get the
members to sponsor them. It naturally follows that if they are not spon-
sored, they will not meet these sham admission requirements. The courts
in looking at the membership process look for a uniform system of ap-
plication treatment and the screening of applicants with sound criteria
for membership.
The second element the court looks at is the overall operation of the
club to determine whether there is a unity of interest and participation by
the entire membership body in the income and profits of the club. When
there is no such participation and the members share only in the expenses
by paying dues and paying for the facilities as they use them, this is a
good indication that the club is not bona fide. In some instances, the
members may elect a Board of Governors or other governing bodies, but
generally it will be found that the members are not allowed to share in
the profits of the organization. The actual control of operations of this
kind stems from the individuals responsible for establishing and organiz-
ing the club. One of the most significant rights of an organization or club
of a bona fide nature is the sharing in the income and profits by the mem-
bers who have paid dues into the club; not merely burdening the expenses
of running the club or operation.9
Many of the cases involving the Civil Rights Act as applied to
private clubs under the public accommodations section will show that
white non-members are allowed to use the facilities when requested, but
Negroes are denied this right because they are not members. This is a
clear view that these organizations are practicing racial discrimination
which is prohibited by the Act. The Act was intended to avert such
practices which are directly contrary to the intention of Congress. Con-
gress passed the Act to end discrimination and humiliation that such
practices cause. "The primary purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
is to solve the problem, the deprivation of personal dignity that surely
accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments."' "Dis-
crimination is not simply dollars and cents, hamburgers and movies; it is
humiliation, frustration and embarrassment that a person must surely
feel when he is told that he is unacceptable as a member of the public be-
cause of his race or his color."'"
Id. at 977.
10 Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States et al., 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
See Justice Goldberg' concurring opinion at 291, also see Black and Douglas at
268 and 279 respectively.
11 Id.
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The financial appearance of the club should be explored with depth.
The courts are not going to overlook the use of the funds of the club,
to determine the actual ownership and the degree of participation of the
club members. In some of the cases that have gone before the courts, it
has been discovered that the actual ownership is by a private stock cor-
poration or a silent partnership.
12
The fifth criteria used by the court in determining whether a club is
"in fact" private or not is the effect the full operation has. on interstate
commerce. This is set forth in Section 201 (C) of the Act, which de-
fines commerce as travel, trade, traffic, transportation or communication
among the several states or between the District of Columbia and any
state. When any one of the facilities of an establishment offers to serve
or serves interstate travelers as defined by the act, this is sufficient to
bring the entire establishment under the act. When any restaurant or
other type of eating facility that sells food for consumption on the prem-
ises or a substantial portion of the food it serves moves in commerce,
the Act can apply.'" Many so-called private clubs have dining rooms
principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises. A
substantial portion of the food they serve does move in commerce and
the facilities will offer and serve interstate travelers.* Here the court will
explore the entire commercial import of the establishment, and when ap-
plying the substantial portion test, the meaning given it is that the main
foods consumed have moved in commerce. In Katzenbach v. McClung, 4
the court said:
The refusal to serve Negroes and their total loss as customers, lessens
the number of customers a restaurant enjoys, therefore it sells less food
and consequently it buys less. 'This type of discrimination imposes an
artificial restriction on the market and interferes with the flow of
merchandise, and interstate travel is impeded by such discrimination.'
The courts have declared that Congress was within its power in
enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to regulate commerce as applied
to a place of public accommodation serving interstate commerce. The
" See generally, Castle Hill Beach Club v. Arbury, 142 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1955).
1" Daniel v. Paul, 393 U.S. 975 (1969); Wooten v. Moore, 400 F.2d 239
(1968) ; Katzenbach v. McClung et al., 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Gregory v. Meyer,
376 F.2d 509 (1967); Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
* Note-See legislative history to the effect that the Civil Rights Act, Title II,
uses the term "substantial." Hearings on Senate Bill 1732 before the Senate Com-
mittee on Commerce. S. Rep. No. 872 88th Congress 2d. Session pp. 171-173,
212, 229.
"379 U.S. 294 (1964).
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interstate movement of people is commerce which concerns more than
one state. This was the court's opinion in Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
United States.5 Many clubs have lodging facilities for non-member white
transient guests, but Negroes cannot lodge at these facilities, so it is up
to the courts to enforce the moral as well as the legal principle that a
person traveling in interstate commerce must at least have the oppor-
tunity to lodge at night. The refusal to lodge Negroes in interstate
travel, and the acceptance of white transient guests who are not members
of these clubs with facilities for guests in interstate travel, amply demon-
strate the practice of discrimination because of color and race. This in
itself interferes with interstate commerce and is directly contrary to the
full enjoyment of goods, services, privileges, facilities and accommoda-
tions that Congress intended to grant by enacting Section 201 (A) and
201 (a) 1 of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Congress, in enacting section 201a and 201(a), intended to vindicate
human dignity and not mere economics. The long practices of racial
discrimination by state laws, custom and tradition were a raft which
Congress intended to destroy, and the Act was to reassure the rights
granted by the 14th Amendment, 13th Amendment, and the Due
Process Clause of the 5th Amendment.16
Interstate commerce may also entail the entertainment the club has
or the participants in the entertainment. If any of the entertainment,
whether persons or equipment, have moved in commerce then this is a
strong indication that the establishment is involved in interstate com-
merce. The entertainment is not limited or restricted to exhibitive type,
but may also be participative.17 The golf and country club may be an il-
lustration of the participative type of accommodation. These types of clubs
have so many of their facilities for public entertainment, that may very
well come within the Act upon examination by the courts. Golf and coun-
try clubs generally have facilities for swimming, golfing, tennis, and eat-
ing facilities for the public. By virtue of the type of events that these clubs
have it is reasonable to say that guests are not always members and in
many instances may be transient guests. Sports events may be carried
on on the premises, such as golf tournaments and some of the partici-
pants have in many cases traveled in interstate commerce to participate in
15 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
'6 Id.
' Miller v. Amusement Enterprises Inc., 394 F.2d 342 (1968) ; see also Daniel
v. Paul 393 U.S. 975 (1969).
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the event. "The court in its interpretation of section 201 of the act
relating to entertainment has not limited its interpretation to 'exhibitive
entertainment,' but has also included participative entertainment declar-
ing that this view would not be contrary to the theory of 'ejusdem
generis.' ""
The final criterion examined by the court is the involvement of the
state as related to its support in discriminatory policies practiced by es-
tablishments. "This support may be under color of statutory law, local
ordinances or by color of custom."' 9 There are various ways in which a
state may support discrimination under color of law or custom. The state
may give the so-called private golf club special tax assessments for the
establishment and maintenance or continued existence of clubs which
provide special entertainment and recreation for state residents." The
control is found to be indirect. The establishment or country club is
controlled by the state in the sense that by setting a certain standard of
compliance in order to qualify for this special privilege, and continue
to receive the special privilege, the state can revoke the privilege if con-
formity is not maintained. If the club is practicing discrimination and the
state awards the privilege with knowledge of this fact, it may be said that
the state is supporting the discriminatory policies of the club under color
of law. "It is settled law that the governmental sanction need not reach
the level of compulsion to clothe what is otherwise private discrimina-
tion with state with state action."'" "When a state function or responsi-
bility is being exercised by an otherwise non-governmental organization,
it matters not for the 14th Amendment purposes that the institution actu-
ally chosen would otherwise be private, the equal protection guarantee ap-
plies.""
F. WINSTON POLLY
's Id. at 344.
Pub. L. No. 88-352; 78 Stat., 241, The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title II, sec-
tion 201 D (1) (1964).
"See, MARYLAND ANNOTATED STATUTES, art. 81, § 19(e) (1965).
2t Simpkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323 F.2d 959 (1963).
'Id. at 961, see also Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Terry v.
Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
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